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1. Introductory Remarks 
Any discussion of Sino・Westernre1ations needs to be preceded by a defi凶-
tion of the term “Western". One should particular1y note that for the period 
from 1928 to 1938 it is not appropriate to c1assify Germany as“Western" 
when reference is made to Japan's foreign policy decision-makers. In geograph-
ical terms，“Western" usually refers to Western Europe， whi1e Germany is con-
sidered part of Central Europe. A typical example of this distinction can be 
found in Henry Cord Meyer's work.(l) This distinction between Western and 
Central Europe has a great deal of validity with regard to the Japanese and 
Chinese po泊tsof view because in Sino・Westernrelations， Britain occupied a 
pivotal position whi1e France played a lesser part. However， the United States 
also played an important role as a Western power， not because of its geograph-
icallocation but because it constant1y supported or at least influenced British 
policies in East Asia. The “Unequal Treaties" with China had placed Britain in 
a vulnerable position， particular1y when Chinese nationa1ists demanded the 
dissolution of these treaties. Eventually this situation proved to be a handicap 
for Britain in her efforts to resist effectively the military thrust of Japan into 
China.(2) The United States， on the other hand， was les burdened by vested 
interest， and in a better position to oppose Japanese expansion. Germany had 
been exc1uded from the East Asian theatre as a great power since its defeat 
in the First World War and since Hitler's seizure of power in January 1933 had 
begun to reshape its policy toward East Asia by supporting Japan's mi1itary 
thrust into China and by openly recognizing the existence of Japan's puppet 
state Manchukuo in February 1938.(3) 
At the Washington Conference (November 1921 -February 1922)， con-
vened by US President Warren G. Harding， the Washington Treaty System was 
established to secure a new po1itical order in East Asia. It consisted of the 
Naval Disarmament Treaty， the Nine Power Treaty， and the Four Power 
Treaty. The Nine Power Treaty was a strong reaffirmation of the American 
policy in China pre吋ous1yknown as the ‘Open Door Policy¥ 
As A. Whitney Griswold and George Kennan have pointed out， the circum-
stances under which the Open Door Policy was made public are rather obscure. 
However， once this policy was pronounced by Secretary of State John Hay in 
his Open Door Circular (July 1900)， it was reaffirmed again and ag 
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checking Japan's expansion onto the Chinese continent. 
Within the short period from 1917 to 1922， Japan lost both Britain and 
Tsarist Russia as alies: by signing the Four Power Treaty with the United 
States， Britain， and France， Japan dissolved the Anglo・JapaneseA1liance of 
1902， which had been a mainstay of Japanese diplomacy， and the October 
Revolution加 1917terminated the quasi-military a1iance between Russia and 
J apan formed in July 1916 and known as the Fourth Russo-J apanese 
Entente. (5) 
Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara tried to adjust Japan's policy to its rela固
tively isolated position by scrupulously adhering to the Washington Treaty 
System. When the national unification movement of Chiang Kai-shek's Nation-
alist Party threatened Japan's interests in China， the dissatisfaction with and 
a ttacks against “Shidehara Peace Diplomacy" became more and more pro-
nounced in Japan， particular1y from among the Japanese colonists in Man-
churia. The Kwantung Army of Japan guarding the rai1way network of the 
South Manchurian Railway Company uti!ized this mood to establish control 
over Manchuria by military action in September 1931. The “Manchurian Inci-
dent" strengthened the influence of the military on Japanese politics to such a 
degree that Michio Fujimura， Professor of Japanese History at Sophia Univer-
sity in Tokyo， recently felt justified in presenting a hypothesis of the “two 
occupations"加 therecent history of Japan. According to Fujimura， the first 
occupation of Japan was one by her own army from 1931 to 1945 and the 
second that by the United States military forces under General MacArthur 
from 1945 to 1952. (6) 
2. The Manchurian lncident as a 'Coup d'Etat' o[ the Japanese Army 
After the Washington Conference， four movements were active on the Chi-
nese Continent. They existed simuItaneously and caused a number of conflicts: 
(1) The National Unification movement of the Chinese government in Nan-
k泊g.
(2) British efforts to secure Britain's privi1eged position and interests in China， 
a legacy from her colonial past. 
(3) American efforts to secure observance of the Open Door Policy by other 
powers. 
(4) Japanese efforts to establish military predominance over Manchuria and 
Northern China. 
The Nine Power Treaty was not strong enough to dissolve many of the con-
flicts arising from the collision of these four contradictory movements. It 
failed to recognize the significance of Soviet Russia as an emerging new wor1d 
power. Nor did it treat China as an equal partner， despite its curb on expansion 
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into China by the Western powers and Japan， whi1e not obliging China to fo1-
10w any prescribed course of action. (7) 
Japan's foreign policy decision-making process has to be seen within this 
context. It is a process far too complicated to be grasped by any one compact 
theoretica1 approach. 1 shall therefore try to out1ine the perceptions of the 
decision-makers individually and present a survey of the major prob1ems they 
had to dea1 with during this period. Special attention must be paid to the 
moves of the Japanese miItary， asfactors influencing and often deciding 
Japan's decision-making process， because ever since the turmoi1 surrounding 
Japan's signing of the London Nava1 Disarmament Treaty in 1930， i.e. just 
short1y before the outbreak of the Manchurian lncident on 18 September 
1931， military intervention in politics was crucia1 to domestic and externa1 
policy decision欄makingin Japan.(8) 
As Japan's De1egate at the Washington Conference， Shidehara had tried to 
work out the Nava1 Disarmament Treaty， together with the American P1enipo-
tentiary， Char1es Evans Hughes. Ever since his appointment to the Foreign 
Minister， Baron Shidehara had done his best to guide Japan.ese dip10macy in 
accordance with the Washington Treaty System. As mentioned above， when 
the nationa1 unification movement of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party ap-
peared to threaten Japan's interests in China， dissatisfaction with and attacks 
against the ‘Shidehara Peace Dip10macy' grew more and more vio1ent in Japan. 
The Privy Counci1 forced the resignation of the First Wakatsuki Cabinet of the 
Minsei・toParty of 26 April1927， when it refused the extraordinary imperia1 
ordinance which Prime Minister Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki had issued in order 
to save the Taiwan Bank from bankruptcy. The rea1 target of the Privy Coun-
ci1， however， was Shidehara， the Foreign Minister， who was a1so forced to 
resign. ln this way， the Privy Counci1 reflected public dissatisfaction with 
Shidehara's China policy. ln response to this public mood， Prime Minister 
Giichi Tanaka， president of the Seiyii-kai Party and Genera1 in active service， 
tried to steer， at1east in form， a more militant course toward China. By send欄
ing Japanese troops to Tsinan of the Shantung peninsu1a， he brought about a 
military conflict with Chiang Kai-shek's army resu1ting in the Tsinan lncident 
of 3 May 1928.(9) 
ln spite of the unsuccessfu1 and unnecessary expedit 
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Plenipotentiary， Count Uchida， a former foreign minister， to sound out 
British diplomats on the possibi1抗yof Anglo・Japanesecooperation in China.(l1) 
In June 1929， Tanaka resigned because he believed that he no 10nger had the 
Emperor Hirohito's confidence after he had tried to conceal Colone1 Daisaku 
Komoto's role in the assassination of General Chang Tso・1inon 4 June 1928. 
When the Hamaguchi Cabinet succeeded the Tanaka Cabinet， Shidehara was 
re-appointed to the Foreign Ministry. As before， Shidehara as Foreign Minister 
of the Hamaguchi Cabinet and of the Second Watatsuki Cabinet was not suc-
cessfu1 in his attempts to convince peop1e that by adhering to the Washington 
Treaty System Japan could effectively dea1 with growing Chinese nationalism 
and guarantee nationa1 safety for a non-aligned Japan. Akira Iriye speaks of the 
negative reaction of the Japanese masses against tl).e dip10matic elites repre-
sented by Shidehara.(l2) 
This 1ack of persuasion became obvious in Shidehara's par1iamentary speech 
on the 1ρndon Naval Disarmament Treaty， which he gave on 25 Apri11930.(13) 
The same weakness can a1so be seen among the supporters of the pro-Ang10-
American course in Japan who were politicians and bureaucrats at the Imperial 
Court with Prince Kin-mochi Saionji and Count Nobuaki Makino as their chief 
representatives.(14) Both Saionji and Makino had attended the Paris Peace Con-
ference as Japan's delegates in 1919 and realized that J apan had to adjust its 
policy to the democratic tendencies that prevai1ed after the First World War. 
Shidehara had thereby come to be their favourite diplomat and was effective1y 
chosen by these elites surrounding the Imperial Court to adjust Japan's dip-
lomacy to the new trend introduced by US President Woodrow Wi1son's in-
sistence on the New Diplomacy.(lS) 
Dissatisfaction and uneasiness were especially strong among the Japanese col-
onists in Manchuria， because they felt that the growth of Chinese nationalism 
was threatening their position. Fully aware of the situation， the leaders of 
the Kwantung Army stationed in Mukden secured the colonists' moral support 
and planned and executed the mi1tary operation against Genera1 Chang Hsueh-
liang's army stationed in Manchuria. Fujimura insists that the notorious Oc-
tober Incident of 1931 cannot be interpreted as an abortive and ill-prepared 
coup d'etat， but has to be reinterpreted as a careful 
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dignity. If any statement which might cast suspicion on the action ofthe army 
were to be uttered from within the government， the army should wam the 
government showing a firm resolution. 
(2)百leK wantung Army shou1d protest strong1y to the branch offices of the 
Foreign Ministry in Manchuria and of the South ManchuI匂nRailway Company 
about their reports which might cast suspicion on the army's actions. And the 
army should prohibit any such treacherous conduct. 
(3) The army should threaten the government by organizing a large-scale de幽
monstration ral1ying the right-wing groups. 
(4) If the government should reject the request of the army despite al1 these 
measures， the War Minister should resign requesting the demission of the whole 
Cabinet. If the Cabinet intended to survive by nominating a retired general as 
War Minister， the army should prevent this nomination.(l7) This document 
ends with the proposal of saigo-saku (日nalmeasure): 
If the government were to hush up this Incident or to utilize it as a means to 
suppress the army and thereby dishonour it， we should cary thr<?!lgh resolutely 
a ~~up d'etat with the aim of preserving the eternity of the state.(18) 
Fujimura assumes that the so-cal1ed “October Incident" was p訂tof this plan. 
According to him， the coup d'etat plan was intentionally leaked by the army to 
the civi1ian politicians to terrify them. In the middle of November 1931， 
Foreign Minister Shidehara， who had remained highly critical of the army's 
mi1itary action in Manchuria， ceased to resist the mi1itary;(19)“Shidehara Peace 
Diplomacy" collapsed totally before he was forced to resign in December 1931. 
It was due to this success， says Fujimura， that the October Incident was not 
thorough1y carried out. (20) 
It shou1d be noted in this context， that the Japanese Anny had learned from 
the assassination of General Chang Tso・1inby Colonel Daisaku Komoto of the 
Kwantung Army(21) that without the support of the home government， 
mi1itary action alone was doomed to fai1ure. Komoto murdered General Chang， 
but he was not able to give rise to the military action of the Kwantung Army 
as whole.(22) 
At the time of the Manchurian Incident， Japan was a standing member of 
the League of Nations Counci1 to which China also belonged. After Japan's 
invasion， China appealed to the League quo世ngthe League Covenant， Article 
1. However， the wor1d's interest was then not focussed on Manchuria， but on 
the Wor1d Economic Crisis， especial1y on the suspension of the gold standard 
by Britain. The League's frst response to the Manchurian Incident was there-
fore merely lukewarm.百leLeague Counci1 of 30 September 1931 passed a 
resolution concerning the Manchurian problem consisting of nine items. The 
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tone was optimistic and there was no fixed date with regard to the withdrawal 
of the Japanese Army.(23) On the other hand， the League Counci1 was eager to 
consult with the United States， although the United States was not a member 
of the League. In the initial phase of the Incident， United States Secretary of 
State， Henry L. Stimson， relied on Shidehara's skil for a management of the 
crisis. However， this reliance on Shidehara was shattered when the Kwantung 
Army bombed Chinchou where General Chang Hsueh-liang's most恒lportant
mi1tary base was located.(24) 
On 7 January 1932， Stimson dec1ared in a note disptached to China and 
Japan that the United States did not approve any Japanese military action in 
Manchuria. As Griswold has pointed out， (25)the Stimson Doctrine meant the 
reaffinnation on a large scale ofthe traditional United States Asian policy， that 
is， of the Open Door Policy. In China this policy consisted of， asmight be ex圃
pected， an “open door" in China， equality of opportunity in the trade in 
China， and the safeguarding of its territorial and administrative integrity. The 
Times criticised the Stimson Doctrine by saying that the administrative in-
tegrity of China， which Stimson had assumed， was non-existent. As wil1 be dis・
cussed later， this attitude reflected the British point of view in those days.(26) 
Because of the collapse of the Wakatsuki Cabinet in December 1931， Shide-
hara had to resign， but he was to return to public office as Prime Minister of 
Japan in October 1945. Unti1 that date， he was not able to influence Japanese 
diplomacy and his resignation caused a diminution of the influence of the 
civi1an diplomats. The phase of dual diplomacy emerged.(27) This is not to say 
that the civi1ans were able to compete with the mi1tary on an equal footing. 
It is rather that the civilians， ranging from the top echelons to the consuls in 
Manchuria and China， became followers of the military by experiencing strong 
mi1itary influence担 therealm of diplomacy. In this sence， the Manchurian 
Incident was a watershed in civi1-military relations in the modern history of 
Japan.(28) 
Neither the Japanese Prime Minister Wakatsuki nor the Foreign Minister' 
Shidehara were able to control the arbitrary action of the Japanese Army in 
Manchuria. There were several factors which hindered the civi1 politicians in 
their efforts to control the military. First of al， the constitutional system of 
Japan， w 
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Japan's alienation from a Western-oriented League of Nations and its surround-
加grules of international behavior， her disi1usionment with the notional Wash幽
ington Conference system of cooperation加theFar East， and the unstable and 
ineffectual nature of her own civilian policy-making institutions， overshadowed 
as they were by the actions and wishes of the Army.，(29) 
The extent to which Sino・Westemcooperation could be achieved within the 
framework of the League of Nations was expressed in the famous Lytton 
Report conceming the Manchurian Incident. Japan's reaction to this report was 
its withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933. When we examine 
this report， we find that， a1though it defmed the Japanese military action in 
Manchuria as an aggression and not as an act of self-defence， it did not propose 
any sanction by the League of Na世onsagainst Japan. The biographer of 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai圃shekwas right in criticizing the fact that this report 
cautiously evaded the application of the sanction according to Artic1e XVI of 
the Covenant of the LeaguePO) 
However， itis an undeniable fact that Japan decided to discard in her policy 
the course of cooperation with Britain and the United States. Foreign Minister 
Shidehara was more eager to follow this course in his days as Minister of the 
Cabinets of Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki (1929-31)也anas Minister of the Kato 
Cabinet and the First Wakatsuki Cabinet (1924-27).(31) The change of ci吋1・
military relations within Japan caused a reorientation of its diplomacy which， 
in turn， led to a tightening of Sino・West町'llrapprochement.τhe mood of 
temporary rapprochement between Nationalist China and Japan shortly after 
the Nanking Incident of 24 March 1927，(32) just a litt1e before Shideha問、
demission as Minister of the First Wakatsuki Cabinet， and simi1ar situations 
between China and Japan disappeared totally after the outbreak of the Man-
churian Incident. 
3. The International ci・rcumstancesSurrounding the Manchurian Incident 
When the Kwantung Army of Japan be伊nits military action泊 Manchuria，
the most influential powers of the wor1d， Britain， the United States， and 
France， were al suffering from the impact of the Wor1d Economic Crisis which 
had originated in the New York stock market in October 1929. The economic 
crisis of the United States directly influenced Germany and then spread 
gradua11y to Britain and France. The reason why the crisis of the United States 
entang1ed other countries consisted in the fact that the economies of these four 
countries were linked by the reparation problem ofGermany. The Dawes P1an 
concerning the payment of reparations by Germany a110wed abundant loaning 
from世間 UnitedStates， both short and long term， tobe introduced to Ger-
many. This loaning， intum， enabled Germany to pay reparations to Britain 
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and France. In this way， Britain and France were ab1e to repay their war debts 
to the United States. The outbreak of economic panic in the United States， 
however， short-circuited this circulation. On 6 Ju1y 1931， President Hoover 
was forced to dec1are the “Hoover Moratorium" on the payment of both repa-
ration and war debts. 
Unti1 the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident， the White House Staff under 
President Hoover had not been especially antagonistic towards Japan. Indeed， 
the Secretary of the Interior， Ray L. Wi1bur， the Secretary of War， Patrick 
Hur1ey， the Secretary of the Navy， Char1es F. Adams， and the Secretary of 
State， Henry L. Stimson， were al without exception rather friendlily disposed 
to抗.Wi1bur， for examp1e， had once condemned the 1924 Immigration Act， 
which prohibited the immigration from Japan to the United States， as“offens-
ive to Japan and Asia".(33)“Stimson came to the State Department accepting 
what was a1ready the predominant assumption there， that a modus vivendi with 
Japan was both possible and 1ike1y. Thereafter， hewas impressed by Shidehara's 
approach to internationa1 re1ations， and by the concessions made by the Japa-
nese at the London Nava1 Conference".(34) Wi1iam R. Cast1e， who had been 
Ambassador to Japan， was appointed as Stimson's Undersecretary by the death 
of his predecessor Joseph Cotton in March 1931. Cast1e's stay in Japan had 
reinforced the beHef that Japan's“predominance in eastern Asia was not only 
inevitab1e but， asa stabi1sing factor， inthe interest of the United States".(3S) 
With regard to the perception of American diplomats concerning the Man-
churian prob1em， Christopher Thorne has written: 
Growing tension over Manchuria had not gone unnoticed in Wasrungton 
during the summer of 1931. Most American observers on the spot， however， 
unlike several of也.eirBritish colleagues， had doubted whether an explosion 
was imminent: early in September， Nelson Johnson (U.S. Minister to China) 
was describing a Chinese oficial's story of J apanese plans to occupy the area 
within the next three months as “highly improbable" and “fantastic"， while 
warning signs in Tokyo did not disturb Cameron Forbes's concentration on 
his new Embassy building and polo ponies.(36).' 
Forbes was the U.S. Ambassador to Japan during these fatefu1 days. 
We may conc1ude from this situation， that the outbreak of the Manchurian 
Incident struck the United States a1most as an unexpected thunderbo1t from 
the b1ue. What was the British situation at that time? 
The Prime Minister，)ames Ramsay MacDona1d， was forced to resign on 23 
August 1931) because his saving p1an which cut the fund of unemp10yment 
insurance and that of unemp10yment allowance by 10 per cent met with the 
opposition of Cabinet members representing the interests of the trade unions. 
MacDonald organized a coaHtion cabinet without the support of his own party. 
This Third MacDona1d Cabinet， the “National" government， experienced the 
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Invergordon“mutiny". On 21 September， the Cabinet was forced to aban-
don the gold standard， an incident which attracted the attention of the wor1d's 
journalists far more than the Manchurian Incident. On 7 October， the British 
Parliament was disso1ved and for the next three weeks the country was “im-
mersed" in a fierce e1ection campaign.(37) 
R. Bassett reports on the indifference of the British po1iticians to Manchuria 
as follows: 
Two very brief statements on Manchuria had been made in reply to questions 
before the dissolution. On November 11th Sir John Simon made a longer state-
ment in the same way; but so preoccupied was the country with its own domes-
tic problems that in the Debate on the Address (November 10th-16th) only one 
member appears to have mentioned the subject to Manchuria.(38) 
France， another signatory of the Washington Nava1 Desarmament Treaty， the 
Four Power Treaty which disp1aced the Ang1o-Japanese Alliance and the Nine 
Power Trea ty， was not on1y the pivota1 power of the Versail1es Trea ty System， 
but a1so shared an important ro1e in the Washington Treaty System. Neverthe-
1es， and notwithstanding the fact that France was not so grave1y affected by 
the Wor1d Economic Crisis as other powers， France showed lit1e interest in the 
situation in Manchuria. Thorne says of the French attitude: 
It was European political and security isues which preoccupied France in 
the autumn of 1931: unres01ved naval differences with Italy; the growing 
German clamour for an end to the Versailles restrictions， and the approaching 
dilemma over disarmament. Forthcoming skirmishes in Manchuria might seem 
of litt1e importance by the side of even a single event nearer home， like the 
launching of the pocket-battleship Deutschland in May. (39) 
Judging from the interna1 conditi0ns of the three great powers constituting 
the main signatories of the Washington Treaties， 1931， and particu1ar1y Sep-
tember， was better suited than any other time for the Japanese Army to 1aunch 
a mi1tary adventure in Manchuria. The news of Britain's abandonment of the 
gold standard comp1etely overshadowed any news fぬm Manchuria. From a 
short-term perspective， Japan's invasion of Manchuria was favoured by fortui-
tous international circumstances resulting from the economic crisis. From a 
10nger perspective， the invasion was the beginning of Japan's international isola-
tion and its mi1tary defeat in the Pacific War with the United States， because 
its action challenged direct1y the principle of international politics which had 
functioned since the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The Versail1es Treaty 
System and the Washington Treaty System were supp1ementary to each other. 
The League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were covering up and were 
functioning as reinforcement of the Versai1es Treaty System. The Washington 
Treaty System consisted of the above-said three treaties. The most important 
- 9ー
principle of this treaty was， ashas often been pointed out in this article， the 
Open Door Policy. Japan's mi1tary action was an open chalIenge to al these 
trea ties and principles and江wasonly natural that the US Secretary of State 
Henry L. Stimson declared the following: 
・…theAmerican Govemment deems it to be its duty to notify both the 1m. 
peria1 Japanese Government and the Govemment of the Chinese Republic 
that抗cannotadmit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend 
to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those Govern-
ments， oragents thereof， which may imp油 thetreaty rights of the United 
States or its citizens in China， inc1uding those which relate to the sovereignty， 
the independence， orthe teritorial and administrative integrity of the Re-
public of China， or to the international policy relative to China， commonly 
known as the open door policy; and血atit does not intend to recognize any 
situation， treaty， oragreement which may be brought about by means con-
trary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th， 
1928， to.~hich Treaty both China and Japan， aswell as the United States， are
(40) parties. 
It was a somewhat strange fact that the Japanese Army showed no fe紅 to・
ward the intervention of the Western powers of the Nine Power Treaty against 
its military activity in Manchuria. It was only the movements of the Soviet 
Union， that the Japanese Army was high1y sensitive to. On 1 March 1932， 
Colonel Doihara ofthe Kwantung Army told a Japanese local reporter from the 
Kyushu Nippo， that it was a matter of great conc町n“tothe p回 cein Asia and 
wor1d peace" which of the two things was to be completed ear1ier: the estab-
lishment of the new state “Manchukuo" or the Five Year Plan of the Soviet 
Union.(41) 
Lieutenant General Kuniaki Koiso， chief of the Military Affairs Bureau 
(Gunmu-kyoku) of the War Ministry at the point of time of the outbreak of 
the Manchurian Incident and later Prime Minister during the Pacific War， 
opposed the Kwantung Army's plot shortly before the outbreak of the Inci-
dent， because he heard of the possibi1ity of military collision with the Soviet 
Union in Manchuria.(42} 
It should be stressed that Sino-Western rapprochement began at a time when 
Japan was launching her mi1tary invasion of Manchuria. Any traces of rap-
prochement between the Chinese Nationalist government and Japan， stil a 
viable hope in the days of Shidehara Diplomacy and even in those of General 
Tanaka's premiership， vanished completely. Chiang Kai-shek was forced nolens 
volens to rely upon the assistance of the Western powers to resist Japan. 
At the end of my consideration of the international circumstances surround-
ing the Manchurian Incident， I would like to mention Generalissimo Chiang's 
views on Japan's policy towards China， the United States， and other powers. He 
made the folIowing remarks shortly after the end of the Manchurian Incident. 
Giving a speech at a mi1tary training school in March 1934， the Genera1issimo 
pointed out that although Japan had a strong mi1tary presence in China， its
final旬rgetwas not China， but the Soviet Union for the Japanese Army， and 
Britain and the United States for the Japanese Navy. He prophesied that Japan 
would provoke a drawn圃outwar doomed to fai1ure. He viewed this coming war 
as a good opportunity for the 1iberation of China from Japanese mi1itary inter-
ference. Unti1 this as yet unknown date， it was only a question of resisting that 
was vital for China.(43) 
4. The Amo Statement 
As an outstanding example of Japan's reaction to Sino・Westem“coopera-
tion" from the period after the Manchurian lncident unti1 the outbreak of the 
Sino・JapaneseWar加 1937，1 should like to mention two issues: one is the pub-
1ication of the Amo statement in 1934， and the other is the Japanese Army's 
reaction to the currency reform in China introduced by Frederick Wi1iam 
Leith-Ross. 
After the Manchurian lncident 1931-33， cooperation between Nationa1ist 
China and the Western powers increased. In May 1933， the United States 
offered a loan of fifty mi1ion dollars to the Nationa1ist govemment担 China.
百leLeague of Nations also showed concern over China and in June 1934 the 
former Under-Secretary of the League， Jean Monnet， arrived in China to estab-
1igh an economic organization (Development Finance Corporation) for the 
purpose of promoting foreign investments in the Chinese economy. (4) 
Information about Monnet's plans for Sino・Westerneconomic cooperation 
reached the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo as ear1y as March.1934 
and caused irritation. The Amo statement， which appeared in an ill-prepared 
form， was an expression of this irascible mood. (45) 
Eiji Amo， Section Chief of the Information Bureau of the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry， dec1ared in a press conference on 17 Apri11934: 
We oppose .. any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influ. 
ence of any other country in order to resist J apan; we a1so oppose any action 
taken by China ca1cu1ated旬 play(of) one Power ag血 stanother. Any joint 
operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technica1 or 
financial asistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and 
Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance…J apan there-
fore must 0切ectto such undertakings as a matter of principle…肘)
The “Amo statement" became notorious as Japan's dec1aration of an Asian 
Monroe Doctorine and caused strong antipathy in Washington and 1ρndon. 
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In fact， however， this statement was merely an incomplete copy of a tele-
gram dispatched by Foreign Minister Koki Hirota to the Japanese Ambassador 
in China， Akira Ariyoshi. The US Ambassador in Tokyo， Joseph C. Grew， com-
mented in his reminiscences as follows: 
On April 17 Mr. Amau， (47)the spokesman of the Foreign Office， issued his 
famous statement regarding the attitude of Japan toward the rendering ofthe 
assistance to China by other countries， asutterance which was generally re-
garded in Tokyo and abroad as the most important pronouncement of 
Japanese policy toward Chlnil since the presentation of the Twenty-One De. 
mands， the essential basis of the statement reflecting the view of the J apa-
nese Governments before they took any action in China. At first Mr. Amau 
characterized the announcement 郎、nofficial"but later said that it“could 
be considered as official"， Itseems that in a press conference on April 17 
Mr. Amau was questioned regarding the reported opposition of Japan to 
assistance to China by other countries， and that he went to his files and pro・
duced a document in Japanese which appeared to be in the form of an in-
struction addressed to the Japanese Minister in China. Of this document he 
made a rough translation into English which he said was unofficial although 
asserting that the document had received the approval of the Foreign Min. 
ister， and later the same evening he issued to the Japanese press a statement 
in J apanese labeled “unofficial" which was translated and cabled al over the 
wor1d.(48) 
A diplomat who was staff member of the East Asia Bureau of the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry has recollected in an interview with a reporter from the Yomi-
uri Shinbun that Vice-Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu had dictated to him the 
guide-l加eof Japan's China policy and that he had made out a telegram of the 
dictated sentences and shown this telegram to Amo. Incidentally， apress corト
ference was held on the very day and Amo revealed the content of this tele耐
gram to the foreign journalists.(49) According to this diplomat， Ichiroδta， 
such telegrams were normally not shown to the Informa世onBureau. Ota， on 
his own initiative， had carried this telegram to the Section Chief of the In-
formation Bureau and thereby caused the unexpected tumu1t. (50) 
回rota，frightened by the wor1d-wide reverberations caused by the Amo 
statement， which in fact was nothing less than his own secret telegram to the 
Ambassador in China formulated by his Vice-Minister， tried his utmost to 
placate Washington and London by decIaring that Japan would observe al the 
treaties concerning China including the Nine Power Treaty， and would respect 
the Open Door Policy. The British Foreign Minister， Sir John Simon， showed 
himself satisfied by Hirota's decIaration when he gave a speech in the House of 
Commons on 30 Apri1 1934.百leUnited States government responded in a 
s卸lilarway.(51) Despite Hirota's lip-service to the Nine Power Treaty and the 
Open Door Policy， however， the Japanese Army planned to pursue a policy in 
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China which aimed at ignoring this commitment. According to the oral recol-
lections of Kin-mochi Mushakoji， atthat time Ambassador to Berlin， Hirota 
confessed on the occasion of Mushakoji's short stay in Japan， that H廿ota's
job was， inessence， confined solely to the handling of the army and that al 
his efforts were concentrated thereupon.(52) Some of the Foreign Ministry 
officials began to sympathize with the army. Toshio Shiratori， Ambassador to 
Stockholm at the time of the Amo affair， was the conspicuous leader of this 
group.(53) But as can be seen from his secret cable to Ariyoshi in China， which 
was incidentally revealed by Amo， Hirota himself was also following the China 
policy of the mi1tary. The same can be said of Shigemitsu， who had drafted 
the telegram to Ariyoshi. 
5. The Cu"ency Relorrn in China by Frederick William Leith-Ross and the Re-
action 01 the Japanese Army 
Frederick William Leith-Ross was the financial specialist who served as Bri-
tain's representative to the Wor1d Monetary and Economic Conference in 
Lοndon in 1933. Leith-Ross visited Japan in September 1935 and asked for 
Japanese financial cooperation in the currency reform担 China.But Hirota， 
who continued to hold his post as Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of Admiral 
Keisuke Okada (Okada had replaced Admiral Makoto Saito as Premier)， refused 
participation in the project. This negative reaction on the Japanese side re-
flected the China policy of the J apanese Almy. (S 4) On his arrival in China， 
Leith-Ross recommended to the Nationalist government a switch from the 
silver standard to a managed paper cu灯ency.In the emergency degree of 3 
November 1935， the Nationalist government forbade the use of silver cuηency 
and decided to link the new Chinese currency de lacto to British sterling in 
order to stabi1ze it.(5) 
Japan's reaction to this currency reform was almost hysterical. The Kwan-
tung Army commander General Jiro Minami， cabled to the Chief of the 
General Staff in Tokyo， Prince Kan'in， on 12 November 1935， that because 
this currency reform threatened to destroy completely Japan's traditional 
China policy， Japan should cut off Northern China from the Nationalist gov-
ernment加 orderto prevent the currency reform.(56) The Tientsin Army of 
Japan wanted to block delivery of the si1ver currency to the Chinese Central 
government in Nanking through mi1tary force. (57) These hysterical reactions 
were motivated by the Japanese Army's fear of a political union in China， 
which might be realized by the Nationalist government if it used the stable 
cuηency as an effective tool. Ever since the success of Leith-Ross' currency 
reform， the Tientsin Army as well as the Kwantung Army had been trying to 
isolate Northern China and secure it as Japan's sphere ofinfluence.(58) 
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The direct domestic effect of Leith-Ross' success for China was， according to 
Professor Shigeaki Uno of Seikei University， specialist of Chinese contemporary 
history，也atit伺 useda factional change within the Kuomintang Party. The 
pro-Ang1o-American group represented by T.V. Sung (Sung Tze-wen) and 
We1ington Koo， with their foothold in the banks， e.g. the Central Bank of 
China， increased their influence. The pro-Japanese group represented by Wang 
Ching-wei saw their influence decline， especially because the policy of the Japa-
nese Army to prevent with force the execution of the currency reform 
aroused considerable hatred of the Chinese people towards Japan. In the 
course of this uproar，. Tang Yu-jen， Under-Secretary of the Foreign Policy 
Division of the Nanking government， who belonged to Wang's faction， was 
as鎚s位13.ted.(59) 
The most irnportant effect of Leith-Ross' success was， however， according to 
Katsumi Usui， Professor Emeritus of Tsukuba University and specialist in Sino・
Japanese relations， that it made possible China's resistance for eight years dur-
ing the Sino-Japanese War. This resistance was based on Sino-Western coopera-
tion supported by the linkage between the Chinese currency and the British 
Pound. (60) It should be noted here that a wholly different and negative assess-
ment of Leith-Ross' role has recently been offered by another historian， 
Yoichi Kibata， Assistant Professor of Tokyo University. According to Kibata， 
Leith-Ross had litle to do with the currency reform and the new Chinese 
currency was not 1inked with the ster1ing. The so四calledCurrency Stabi1zation 
Lease by the British government was， contrary to common加sistence，never 
granted to the Nationa1ist government.(61) 
Japan's reaction to the currency reform culminated in her effort to iso1ate 
Northern China and to estab1ish a puppet government in that part of the coun-
try. The Japanese Army's experiment of estab1ishing the East Hopei Anti-
Communist Autonomous Counci1 (25 November 1935) was a concrete step in 
this direction.(62) A simi1ar experiment undertaken by the Hopei-Chahar 
Political Counci1(63) failed within a short period of time and evoked the out-
break ofthe Sino-Japanese War. The same policy of setting up a puppet govern-
ment was followed on a larger scale during the Sino-Japanese War and eventual-
ly brought about the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime in 
Nanking.(64) 
The T 
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由eHopei-Chahar Twenty-Ninth Army， and the Tientsin Army. This was the 
conflict which opened the way to the eight-year war between China and 
Japan.(66) 
6. The Brussels Conference 
Shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War， China appealed to the 
League of Nations quoting Articles 10， 11， and 17 of the Covenant. This time 
the Chinese government argued that by resisting Japanese aggression they were 
defending Western interests in China as well. (67) This was，担 actua1ity，an 
attitude contrary to the Chinese Nationa1ist government's traditional policy; 
she had consistently made an effort to terminate the “unequal treaties"; but she 
was now holding a “pro・Western"attitude. It is therefore no wonder that her 
position appeared somewhat ambiguous both to her enemy and her alies， but 
it lasted as a characteristic feature of her policy unti1 the end of the World War. 
When the Brussels Conference convened on 3 November 1937， fol1owing the 
recommendation of the League， Japan did not attend， although the Nine 
Powers and additionally the Soviet Union had been invited. (68) During this co任
ference， Italy signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (6 November)， thereby siding 
with Japan， and opposed China's demand that the powers attending the Brus-
sels Conference should jointly recommend a boycott of export to J apan. 
Therefore no sanction against Japan resulted from the conference. (69) On 22 
November 1937，世leChinese delegate， Wellington Koo， expressed his deep 
dissatisfaction with the continuation of trade with Japan.(70) Because China 
was dissatisfied with the Western powers， Chiang Kai-shek showed some inter-
est in Germany's peace mediations negotiated through German Ambassador 
Oskar Trautmann.C1l) 
The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shinbun (Sankei Press) set up a special edi-
torial office in Taipei in August 1973 to publish a series under the titIe Sho 
Kai-seki Hiroku (From the Private Files of Chiang Kai-shek)， which appeared 
d剖ly仕'om15 August 1974 to the end of 1976 and was later coUected in fiι
teen bound volumes.(72) The abridged English edition reports on the Brussels 
Conference as follows: 
The Conference was formally opened on November 3rd， with the Belgian Fo-
reign Minister， Henri Spaak， inthe Chair. Mr. Norman Davis， the United 
States representative， opened the general discussion on the first day of the 
Conference with a statement which fel far short of the vigorous policy advo-
cated by President Roosevelt at Chicago.(73)“The hostilities which are now 
being waged in the Far East"， hedeclared，“are of serious concern， not only 
to Japan and China， but to the entire world... We expect 
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He added:“The longer the present hostilities continue， the more difficult 
wi1 a constructive solution become， the more harmful wi1 be their effects 
upon Sino.J apanese relations and upon the world， and the more wil1 general 
peace and stability be engendered. It is important that equitable adjustment 
be found." 
The British representative， Mr. Anthony Eden， expressed his entire agree. 
ment with the sentiments ofhis American colleague， and the French delegate， 
M. Delbos， spoke in the same strain. Count Aldrovandi.Marescotti of Italy 
acted as the mouth.piece of J apan.“The only usefuI thing that we can do，" 
he said，“is to attempt to bring the two parties into direct contact with each 
other; after which we have nothing further to do." Thus， inthe opinion of 
the ltalian delegate， the Conference might just as well recognize that it was 
powerIes to apply the principles of the Nine.Power Treaty and of the League 
Covenant to the situation in China. 
It had become al too obvious也atthe prospect of any vigorous concerned 
action by the Powers had faded away to the vanishing po泊t.The United 
States， on whose attitude everything hinged， had manifestedly decided to 
take no initiative in cooperating with other nations to check the “epidemic of 
worId Iawlessness." IsoIationism was st出 rampantin the United States， and 
the po1icy enunciated by President Roosevelt found no popular support. In. 
deed， the policy was opposed by organized labor. 
In such circumstances the Brussels Conference was foredoomed to failure. 
In the declaration issued by the Conference on November 15th， the Sino・
Japanese conflict itself was ieft virtuaIly untouched.(74) 
7. Britain， the United States and Japan in 1938 
The year 1938担 Sino-Westernrelations was so eventful， that抗isbeyond 
the scope of this article to go into details. Therefore 1 shall limit myself to 
some comments on the British， the US and the Japanese positions with regard 
to the Sino-Japanese War. 
At the end of 1936， Britain's investment in China was 60 per cent of total 
foreign investment there， amounting to over 10 billion dollars， while US in-
vestment was only about 2 billion dollars.(75) More than 30 per cent ofBritish 
investment was in泊dustry，which made Britain's position in China very刊 1-
nerable and explains its double-faced position towards Japan. Usui says that 
Britain， whi1e opposing its c1aim to hegemony over China， was ready to work 
out a limited compromise with Japan.(76) Even so， British policy towards Japan 
became less flexible担 thecourse of 1938， and the British Ambassador to 
Tokyo， Sir Robert Craigie， assured US Ambassador Grew in August， that 
Britain would revise its conci1a tory po1icy. (7 7) China desired proof of this 
change in attitude， and in talks on 4 and 5 November 1938， Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek asked British Ambassador Clerk-Kerr for economic assistance， 
which was practica1ly tantamount to an ultimatum.(78) Britain soon decided 
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for a loan of 10 mi1ion pound.(79) Commenting on the Chiang司Kerrtalks， Usui 
points out that Britain was practical1y forced to grant financial support to 
China to make sure that China would not enter into an a1liance with J apan， 
which would have endangered Britain's position in Asia.(80) 
The US point of view was clear1y expressed by Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull on 16 July 1937， ten days after the outbreak of the Sino・JapaneseWar: 
This country (the USA) constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of 
peace .・ Weadvocate abstinence by al nations from use of force in pursuit of 
policy and further interference in the international afairs of other nations. We 
advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peace. 
ful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international 
agreements. Upholding the principle of sanctity of treaties， we believe in modifi. 
cation of provisions of treaties， when need therefor arises， by orderly process 
carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. (81) 
The United States advocated the observance of the Nine Power Treaty and 
thus took a very legalistic attitude which differed from the somewhat more 
flexible British policy. In a letter adressed to Japan's Foreign Minister Hachiro 
Arita of the First Konoe Cabinet， Ambassador Grew reaffirmed this policy. (82) 
Japan， on the other hand， was unwi1ing to adhere to the Nine Power Treaty， 
and in his Cabinet declaration of 2 November 1938， Premier Fumimaro Konoe 
dec1ared the New Order in East Asia: 
What J apan seeks is the establishment of a new order which wil insure the 
permanent stability of East Asia … 
This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid 
and cooperation between Japan， Manchukuo and China in political， economic， 
cultural and other fields. Its objective is to secure international justice， toper. 
fect the joint defense against Communism， and to create a new culture and real. 
ize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia … 
Japan is confident that other Powers wil on their part correct1y appreciate 
her aims and policy and adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in 
East Asia …(83) 
After this dec1aration Arita insisted in his answer to Grew on 18 November， 
that adherence to the “01d Order"， i.e. the Nine Power Treaty， had become 
o bsolete. (84 ) 
The objective of this Konoe dec1aration was to modify an earlier dec1aration 
of 16 January 1938， inwhich he had announced that Japan would “stop deal-
ing with the Kuomintang Government and await the establishment of a new 
Chinese administration， with which she would cooperate wholeheartedly in 
adjusting Sino-Japanese relations and bui1ding a New China.，(8S) Its funda-
mental message， however， proved to be the introduction of a “New Order in 
East Asia" as a slogan which effectively described Japan's new policy. Japan 
now openly ignored the Nine Power Treaty and the US Open Door Policy. 
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In the initial phase of the Sino-Japanese War， the Soviet Union was the most 
ardent supporter， both militari1y and financially， of the Chinese Nationalist 
govemment. After the conc1usion of the Sino・SovietNon開AggressionPact on 21 
August 1937， the Soviet Union supplied China with war credit， mi1itary aero-
planes and volunteer pi1ots.(86) Soviet support seems to have ended in 
1938.(87) Britain and the US gradually increased their support for China， too. 
As a device to counter these moves of the ‘Westem' powers inc1uding the Soviet 
Union， the top leaders of the Japanese Army nourished the idea of strengthen-
ing the Anti-Comintem Pact with Germany and Italy. Their way of think:ing 
can c1early be seen in a document proposed by War Minister Seishirδ Itagaki 
representing the War Ministry. Entit1ed “The Army's Hopes regarding Current 
Foreign Policy"， the War Minister requested: 
Diplomatic eforts should concentrate on the following: 
a) Strengthening of the anti-Comintern axis. 
b) Adopting pos比ivemeasures to persuade the Soviet Union not to participate 
in the China Incident (there is no change in the fundamental policy of discourag-
ing the Societ Union's aggressive intentions toward East Asia). 
c) Induci時 Britainto abandon its policy of supporting Chang Kai-shek. 
d) Persuading the United States at the very least to retain a neutral attitude， if
possible to adopt a pro-Japanese attitude， and especially to strengthen friendly 
economic relations. (8) 
Foreign Minister Kazushige Ugaki， who replaced Hirota on 26 May 1938， 
was an influencial retired general. In spite of his past career as one of the top-
leaders of the army， Ugaki was more cautious in treating the problem of the 
treaty with Germany and Italy than W訂阻nisterItagaki. At a Five Ministers 
Conference on 12 August， Ugaki presented a Foreign Ministry proposal of two 
separate agreements， with Germany and Italy respectively. This proposal re-
quested that“a mutual assistance treaty， aimed at the Soviet Union， should be 
concluded between Germany and Japan" and further “existing cooperation be・
tween Japan and Italy established by the Anti-Comintem Pact wi1 be further 
developed by the conc1usion of a treaty ofneutrality and consu1tation."(89) In 
this document， Japanese-Italian political cooperation，“so long as it was kept 
within proper 1imits"， was thought to“affect favorably our position vis-a・vis
Great Britain".(90) 
War Minister Itagaki countered that he and the army “preferred the German 
plan linking Japan， Italy， and Germany by a single treaty". (91) A German draft 
by Joachim vun Ribbentrop had been conveyed to Japan by Major-General 
Yukio Kasahar丸 Japan'scourier from Berlin， on 5 August.(92) Herewith began 
the lengthy process of the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact， which 
was an important chapter in the domestic and diplomatic history of Japan from 
1938 up to 23 August 1939， when the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 
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was signed in Moscow， a Pact which was a thunderbolt from the blue for the 
Japanese decision-makers， both civil and military. Without going into details， 
it should be mentioned that anti-British fee1ings became increasingly fierce 
during this process. The世deof the anti-British movement culminated during 
the talks between British Ambassador αaigie and Japanese Foreign Minister 
Arita in the summer of 1939. The mass demonstrations in Japan， which must 
have been manipulated by the army， demanded that Britain cease her support 
of the Chinese Nationalist government. (93) 
In his article discussing Anglo-Japanese relations during the Sino・Japanese
war， Kazu Nagai， historian and Assistant Professor of Ritsumeikan University， 
says that one can perceive four altematives regarding Japan's policy toward 
Britain during this period: 
(a) to expel British influence from the Chinese continent (a policy supported 
by right.wing nationa1ists and extremists within the army); 
(b) to wrest concessions from Britain through blackmail by exploiting her weak 
position in China (this was the policy of the top.leaders' of the army); 
(c) to evade confrontation with Britain as much as possible and to foster British 
cooperation with Japan by permitting British economic activity in the Chinese 
teritory occupied by Japan (this was the attitude of‘pro・British'politicians); 
(の tocooperate with Britain (and the U.S.) within the frarnework of the 
Washington Treaty system (Shidehara Diplomacy)β4) 
According to Nagai， both (a) and (d) were unrealistic during the Sino・Japa-
nese War up to the day of Pear1 Harbor. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War 
泊 December1941， (a) was not realizable. Since the outbreak of the Manchuri-
an Incident， (d) was not realizable. The schism between the protagonists of the 
Tripartite Pact among Germany， Italy， and Japan (with Britain and France， not 
only the Soviet Union， aspotential enemies of the Pact) and those who hesi-
tated to include Britain and France as supposed enemies of the Pact， was， ac-
cording to Nagai， just the schism between由ealtematives (b) and (c).(95)官邸
antagonism was fought out泊 theKonoe Cabinet between War Minister Itagaki 
on one side， and Fore取1Minister Arita and Navy Minister Yonai on the other. 
This antagonism was transferred to the next Cabinet headed by Baron Kiichiro 
Hiranuma up to the day of the conc1usion of the German-Soviet NorトAggres-
sion Pact.(96) 
8. From Pax Britannica to Pax Americana 
Japan's military adventure on the Chinese continent， beginning with the 
Manchurian Incident， was doomed to fail加 theend due to the U.S. counter-
attack. In a short span of世me，however， Japan was able to secure Manchuria 
and then a large part of the Chinese continent under its military control， 
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although such actions were incompatible with the principles of the Nine Power 
Treaty and the Open Door Policy. What factors had helped Japan to achieve 
this short-term success? Omitting al historical details， we can闘ythat it was 
mainly because the years from the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident until 
J apan's surrender， 1931-1945， were roughly identical with the final phase of 
the period of transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana in East Asia. 
The Pax Britannica in East Asia， established with Britain's victory in the Opium 
War (1840-42)， was beginning to fal short of breath at the end of the nine-
teeth century， when Britain forma11y secured the Kowloon Peninsula and Hong 
Kong Island(1898). The circumstances surrounding the issuing of the Open 
Door Note by John Hay， ghost-written， itseems， by Alfred E. Hippisley，“a 
British subject and a member of也eαrineseImperial Maritime Customs 
Service"(97) suggest也atBritain was forced to ask the U.S. for help加 securing
her interests in China. The threat coming from a Russia bent on occupying the 
whole of Manchuria， forced Britain not only to ask for American aid， but also 
to conc1ude a military alliance with a small country in East Asia， Japan. 
When the First World War ended， Britain became a debtor nation owing a 
huge amount to the United States and no longer able to uphold the “two 
power standard" of the navy. In the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty 
Britain accepted parity with the United States. 
In 1931， the British government was preoccupied with overcoming the 
economic crisis. When the Manchurian Incident broke out at a time between 
the Invergordon“mutiny" and the decision to leave the gold standard， the 
British government could not afford to pay much attention to Manchuria. 
官leTimes， which often reflected the views of the British government， annoyed 
U.S. Secretary of State Stimson by. criticising his note in its editorial of 11 
January 1932， asfollows: 
In evoking its c1auses (those of the Nine Power Treaty) the American Govern. 
ment may have been moved by the fear that the J apanese au也oritieswould 
set up a virtualy independent administration泊 Manchuriawhich would favour 
Japanese interests to the detriment of the commerce of other nations. It is 
clear that the Foreign Office does not share these apprehensions， and that， 
although the Nine Power Treaty provides for consultation between the inter-
ested Powers， it was not in fact consulted before the Note was communicated 
to Nanking and Tokyo. (98) 
The United States was 1ikewise fully occupied in its efforts to overcome the 
depression and in no position to announce the establishment of a Pax Ameri-
cana， which it potentially， though not consciously， was preparing not only卸
the Western hemisphere， but also in East Asia. When the Bri也hgovernment 
asked the U.S. administration to shoulder the financial and military aid to 
Greece and Turkey and President Truman quickly dec1ared the adoption of the 
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Truman Doctrine in March 1947 in rep1y to the British entreaty， the establish-
ment of a Pax Americana became a c1ear-cut reality. With regard to East Asia， 
the establishment of Pax Americana can be traced further back， that is to say， 
to the victory day of 15 August 1945. Unti1 these dates， confusion resu1ting 
from the transition from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana periods can 
be said to have 1asted for rather a 10ng period. It was in the 1ast phase of this 
transitory period， that both Germany and Japan tried somewhat belatedly to 
bui1d up colonial empires under the dictatorship of Hit1er and a military quasi-
dicta torship resem bling “praetorian ru1e"， respective1y. (99) 
Contemporaneous with the coming of Pax Americana， or in its European 
phase “Pax Russo・Americana"，both Germany and J apan were totally demi1i-
tarized. The “bellicose" nations were thus destroyed. It is an irony of wor1d 
history that China， which gained enormous financial and mi1itary aid from 
Britain， and especially from the United States， came to be 1abel1ed “bellicose" 
after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 by U.S. standard. These stand-
ards were nothing but a dichotomy between the “bellicose" nations and the 
“peace-10ving" nations. (10) 
9. Conclusion 
百lIsarticle has attempted to show that Japan's“bel1icose" policy towards 
the Chinese continent and the Anglo-Saxon powers was to some extent a reac-
tion to the Wor1d Economic Crisis which began in 1929. Japan was able to 
function within the Washington Treaty System as long as the trade system 
between the United States and Japan was well-balanced. Si1k was Japan's most 
important export to America and assured a relatively steady f10w of foreign 
currency into the country. As Gi1bert Ziebura pointed out in a recent study， 
the United States played a pivotal role in the world economic system both泊
Europe and East Asia by linking those regions economical1y.(101) When the 
economic crisis broke out in the United States， the export of si1k experienced a 
huge setback. Between 1929 and 1933 the price of silk went down from 6 
U.S.-Dollar to 1.2 per pound.(102) The “silken thread，(103) on which the 
Japanese economy depended was thus cut off， which meant the 10ss of the 
economic basis for Japan's functioning within the Washington Treaty System. 
Even before the economic crisis hit Japan， two tendencies were noticeable 
in Japan's policy groups. One was oriented towards export to the United 
States and represented by Foreign Minister Shidehara's“Peace Dip10macy". 
The other policy group was interested rather in investing on the Chinese con-
tinent and represented by the China policy of Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka. 
After Tanaka's demission泊 1929，the economic crisis strengthened the power 
of the second policy group with the Japanese Army as its strongest pro-
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motor.(104) The invasion of Manchuria at a time when the three m~or powers 
in the Pacificー theUnited States， Great Britain， and France -were absorbed 
by domestic economic crisis， was an attempt to chal1enge the Washington 
Treaty System， and by defying the League of Nations principles it also af-
fected由eVersailles Treaty System. That “successful" invasion of Manchuria 
increased even more the growing influence of the mi1tary on Japanese 
domestic and foreign po1icy. The resulting change in civil-mi1tary relations in 
Japan was， inthe final analysis， a product not only of the domestic system of 
Japan but also of the Wor1d Economic Crisis which began in the United States 
in October 1929. 
Thus by being aware of the global constel1ations of that period we might be 
able to have a better grasp of the po1itical and economic situation in East Asia. 
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